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Abstract. The focus of this study is on aspects of public debt and austerity policy in the UK. 
It attempts to provide an evaluation of fiscal policy under neoliberalism and to consider the 
relationship between this policy and the macroeconomic performance of the UK economy. 
There also seems to be ambiguities among the policy makers about austerity. Therefore, it 
seems important to examine the issue of government imposed austerity policies and fiscal 
deficits. There is need to borrow to cover the deficits as there is no inflationary pressure in 
the UK. Most democratic solutions against any inflationary pressures are to reduce money 
in circulation through higher taxes. Further I argue that a number of counter measures could 
possibly be taken such as placing a requirement on financial institutions such as pension 
funds to place some minimum proportion of their asset portfolio into government stock.  
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1. Introduction 
he disaffection with the EU in the UK reflects a concern about both the 
quality of and increased demand for public services as well as fears about 
declining wages and incomes, rises in population and the impact on cultural 
change, especially in small towns and rural areas. There also seems to be 
ambiguities among the policy makers about austerity. Therefore, it seems important 
to examine the issue of government imposed austerity policies and fiscal deficits. I 
find there is a gap in the literature about the impact of austerity policy in UK, 
especially since growth is not picking up as expected. The recent IMF report has 
lowered its estimate for UK GDP growth in 2017, downgrading it from 1.7% to 
1.6% and expects the economy to grow by 1.5% in 2018 (Elliott & Inman, 2017). 
Further, on public debt, the IMF report says: "But the UK's public debt remains 
high at 87% of GDP, so continued reduction in the deficit is critical to create 
further room to respond to future shocks." (IMF Report cited in Elliott & Inman, 
2017). Therefore, there is a more urgent need to revisit the austerity policy and I 
hope my study will contribute towards more discussions on this very crucial issue.   
The ‘Leave’ vote was in part a protest against the economic model that has been 
in place for the past three decades and against the austerity policies that emerged 
from it. Austerity was given renewed vigour by the Conservative and Liberal 
coalition government when it came to power in 2010. It has since affected the 
living standards of a large proportion of the working people. Blanchflower (2016) 
argues that:  
[T]he lack of post-Brexit plan and the rise in uncertainty... have caused the 
UK economy to nosedive. This uncertainty will not be resolved for several 
years. The good news is you should be able to make money by buying shares 
and gold. The bad news is that this will widen inequality further, as it does 
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nothing to help the poor, the young and ordinary strugglers who don’t have 
assets (Blanchflower, 2016). 
The Brexit side in the UK’s referendum orchestrated a campaign with features 
typical of the ethno-populism resurgent throughout Europe. Some critiques blame 
the uneven effects of globalisation, which has failed to help those most 
disadvantaged by its impact (Boyer, 2012). It is still important to discuss austerity 
policies and their overall impact on the economy, because the British government 
has an unclear policy, particularly since the Brexit vote. Philip Hammond, the 
current Chancellor of Exchequer has said that he will not to aim to meet George 
Osborne’s debt targets and fiscal rules aimed at balancing the budget by 2020 
because these are no longer viable.  
Soon after the financial crisis in 2008, the UK government allowed the budget 
deficit to rise to expand domestic demand. In the budget for 2008/09 they 
announced a budget deficit (public sector net borrowing) of 2.9% of GDP (2.7% 
cyclically adjusted) with expected growth of around 2% annually (HM Treasury, 
2008). However, a year later, in the budget report for March 2009, the forecast 
budget deficit was a further 4.4% of GDP (7.3%) of which 0.5% was ascribed to 
discretionary measures (Fontana & Sawyer 2012). In 2010, the EU began to show 
concern about rising deficits and announced suggestions to achieve a balanced 
budget. Following the British Parliamentary election in May 2010 and with the 
formation of a coalition government of Conservative and Liberal Democratic 
Parties, deficit reduction as a central policy was announced to address the concerns 
of the credit rating agencies and global financial markets. The planned reduction in 
public expenditure under the Coalition government was 60% greater than that 
advocated by the Labour government in 2015. There was a further reduction of £32 
billion in addition to the £52 billion reduction already announced, making a total of 
£84 billion. The Coalition government estimate was to reduce budget deficits from 
7% of GDP in 2010/11 to 1.9% of GDP by 2015/16, and then to 0.7% of GDP in 
2016/17 (Fontana & Sawyer 2012). 
It was assumed that there would be relevant changes in saving, investment, and 
exports, given that mainstream economists assume a substantial rise in business 
investment following fiscal ‘consolidation’ (Boyer, 2012). The forecast was based 
on high levels of optimism, whilst it ignored the costs of such drastic measures. As 
Fontana & Sawyer (2012) warned:  
‚The balanced budget may be achieved with sufficiently draconian austerity 
programs, though such programs would run a severe risk that economic 
activity, and thereby tax revenues, would fall. Of course, provided that a £1 
million reduction in public expenditure reduced the budget deficit to some 
degree, a balanced budget could be achieved. However, this result will be 
achieved at the cost of greater damage to the economy. What we cast doubt 
on is the simultaneous achievement of a balanced budget and a zero output 
gap‛ (Fontana & Sawyer 2012:37). They further argued:  
The development of credible plans to reduce budget deficits would boost 
confidence, lower interest rates, and so on, which would stimulate 
investment. But, no evidence has been presented to support the view that the 
reduction of public expenditure is necessary for the restoration of confidence, 
‚animal spirits‛, and the like, which would then boost investment (Fontana & 
Sawyer 2012:37). 
Balancing the budget is seen by the government to be very important, and not 
adhering to that means fiscal irresponsibility. The importance of balancing the 
books is repeatedly emphasised by the British government, which ignores that 
economy is different from a family. Contrary to the UK government’s claim, 
Stiglitz (2017) argues: 
In an economy, when government spends more and invests in the economy, 
that money circulates, and recirculates again and again. So not only does it 
create jobs once: the investment creates jobs multiple times. The result of that 
is the economy grows by a multiple of the initial spending, and public 
finances turn out to be stronger: as economy grows fiscal revenues increases, 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 5(2), K. Siddiqui,  p.187-203. 
189 
and demands for… social programmes to help the poor and needy, go down 
(Stiglitz, 2017). 
The government claimed that in the UK welfare spending is too large and needs 
to be drastically reduced. In contrast Ha-Joon Chang argues that: 
The reality is the UK welfare state [spending] is not large at all.  As of 2016, 
the British welfare measured by public social spending) was, at 21.5% of 
GDP, barely three-quarters of welfare spending in comparably rich countries 
in Europe - France’s is 31.5% and Denmark’s is 28.7% for example. The UK 
welfare state is barely larger than the OECD average (21%), which includes a 
dozen or so countries such as Mexico, Chile, Turkey and Estonia, which are 
much poorer and/or have less need for public welfare provision. They have 
younger populations and stronger extended family networks (Chang, 2016).  
George Osborne claimed during the last Parliament that the budget deficit 
would be eliminated. He asserted that the negative balance between public revenue 
and overall public expenditure required urgent policy measures. The proponents of 
balanced budgets argue that deficits keep upward pressure on market interest rates. 
As a consequence, those government bonds sold on the market will compete with 
private borrowing, leading to a rise in interest rates and in the cost of borrowing 
which will ultimately cause a fall in investment, an effect sometimes described as 
‘crowding out’ (Wade, 2009). The George Osborne said on 10th June 2015: 
[I]n normal times, the governments of the left as well as the right should run 
a budget surplus to bear down on debt and prepare for an uncertain future… 
[i]n the budget we will bring forward this strong new fiscal framework to 
entrench this permanent commitment to that surplus, and the budget 
responsibility it represents (Osborne, 2015). 
The plan of the article is as follows: section 1 presents background information 
on the topic. Section 2 discusses the debate on public debt. Section 3 analyses the 
reasons behind turning to austerity. Section 4 focuses on neoliberalism and 
financialization. Section 5 looks at macroeconomic performance. Finally section 6 
concludes. 
The question arises as to why governments would pursue an economic austerity 
policy in the current context of economic recession. It seems that class interests lie 
behind the ideology of austerity as an analysis of the distribution of benefits and 
burdens shows. In fact, the ideology of ‚budget surplus‛ ignores the fact that 
during the recession, aggregate demand, economic activity and tax revenues 
decline, while at the same time unemployment benefit payments increase. In fact, 
history offers scant examples of the pro-cycle fiscal contraction programmes that 
have succeeded in avoiding macroeconomic stagnation (Blyth, 2013). 
From 2010, the coalition government found an opportunity in the crisis and 
imposed austerity, reducing public spending and benefits thus ensuring that the 
burden of their policies fell disproportionately on the poorer sections of British 
society. UK’s social policies aimed at disciplining vulnerable sections of the 
society. As Davies notes:  
Under Britain’s ‘benefit sanctions’ regime, welfare payments can be 
suddenly suspended for up to a month on account of trivial breaches, without 
any sense of procedural reason as to how the rules are applied. One man had 
a heart attack on the way to an appointment, but was nevertheless sanctioned; 
another lost his benefits for going to his brother’s funeral, having been unable 
to get through when he tried to phone the job Centre. Over a million people 
in the UK have received sanctions for one reason or another. Thousands have 
died after being declared ‘fit to work’ by workfare contractors and having 
their disability benefits cut (Davies, 2016:122). 
Despite the UK’s dependence on the financial sector there is a sharp difference 
between the ability of Eurozone countries and of the UK to cope with the 
consequences of the recessions in that the UK has its own central bank and 
currency and can potentially pay its own debts,  most of which are denominated in 
sterling (Dunn, 2014). For Eurozone member countries the ECB does not have an 
explicit ‘lender of last resort’ obligation as in the case of the US Federal Reserve 
and the Bank of England (Wade, 2009). 
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2. The debate on public debt 
The issue of public debts in the past had been widely discussed and debated.  
Since 2010, rising public debts were also seen as alarming and austerity was 
proposed in some quarters to reduce levels of public debt. Therefore, it would be 
useful here to examine historically how the policy makers and academics presented 
their views on this subject. It is also more important because mainstream 
economists ignore the historical, social and political ideas of classical economists 
and divorce economics from its historical context. They present the primacy of 
markets in determining relative prices and income distribution and further argue 
that government spending undermines the functioning of the market (Siddiqui, 
2015a; Venugopal, 2015). 
David Hume the 18th century British classical political economist focused on the 
re-distribution effects of public debt. He denounced it and emphasised that the 
burden of taxation in the 18th century fell on landowners and poor labourer who 
financed the interest payment received by the financiers. David Hume expressed 
his views on public credit in his essay ‚Of Public Credit‛ in 1752, and his views 
appear not to relate to the historical facts. Public debt as we know it only goes back 
to about three centuries. In 1700, British public debt was £14.2 million. Hume in 
another essay, ‚Of Civil Liberty‛, emphasised on debt-service: 
[T]axes may, in time, become altogether intolerable, and all the property of 
the state be brought into the hands of‛ the government. If it is not curbed, we 
may come to ‘‘curse our liberty (cited in Laursen & Coolidge, 1994:146). 
Another prominent classical economist, namely Adam Smith, witnessed that the 
British government’s borrowing was consistently rising in order to fund foreign 
military adventure. He expressed concerns about the rising sovereign debt and 
criticised the mercantilist attempt to finance overseas expansion through the debt 
which, according to Adam Smith, imposed fiscal burdens on future generations. 
Later on, in the early decades of the 19th century and during the end of the 
Napoleonic wars, Britain had accumulated a huge amount of public debt. 
Compared to Adam Smith’s era, and later when David Ricardo was writing, Britain 
was more advanced in technology, commerce and trade, and had also colonised 
more overseas territories. Ricardo analysed the issue with relative ‘equivalence’ of 
financing a war by means of taxation or by issuing of government bonds (Ricardo, 
2002, first published in 1817). He ignored the redistributive effects of public debts 
as he himself was the largest loan contractor to the government. Ricardo argued 
that people would most likely oppose increased taxation to fund the war but were 
in favour of borrowing. He concluded: ‚During peace, our increasing efforts should 
be directed towards paying off that part of debt which has been contracted during 
war‛ (Ricardo, 2002: 288). As Joan Robinson commented that:  
For fifty years before 1914 the established economists… had all been 
preaching one doctrine of laissez faire… free trade and balanced budgets 
were all that was required… The doctrines were still dominant in 1914 
(Robinson, 1972:2). 
Now let us look at the issue of public debt in the first half of the 20th century. 
After World War I, British hegemonic power declined and the country was unable 
to take strong policy measures. The US, which was the emerging global power, 
was reluctant to step in and provide liquidity during this crisis. In Britain during the 
1920s, there were already growing socio-economic crises with high levels of 
unemployment and balance of payments deficits, but nevertheless the government 
continued to pursue restrictive economic policies. Despite this, little success was 
achieved in reducing public debt. Neo-classical economists blame the cause of 
Great Depression largely on the role of restrictive monetary policy implemented as 
a result of the gold standard (Tcherneva, 2012). Public debt as a percentage of GDP 
rose from 25% in 1914 to 182% in 1923, and in 1929 it declined to 160%, but 
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during the Great Depression public debt rose to 178% in 1933. However, as the 
economy picked up, public debt fell to 111% by 1940 (Konzelmann, 2014).  
Winston Churchill also endorsed Treasury view in his 1929 budget speech:  
the burning question of whether national prosperity can be restored or 
enhanced by the government borrowing money and spending it on making 
more work. The orthodox Treasury view… is that when the government 
borrow[s] in the money market it becomes a new competitor with industry 
and engrosses to itself resources which would otherwise have been employed 
by private enterprise, and in process it raises the rent of money to all who 
have need of it (Churchill, 1929: 53, cited in Konzelmann, 2014:712). 
After the First World War, the economies of European countries such as Britain, 
France and Germany were very weak, whilst the US emerged much stronger 
economically. These European countries tried to return to gold standard, but they 
faced difficulty in re-establishing parity at pre-war level. This meant adapting 
austerity policies to reduce domestic prices. In the UK, the Treasury’s views on 
balancing the budget were maintained up to the late 1920s when the post war 
slump turned into deep depression. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stanley 
Baldwin commented in 1922: ‚Money taken for government purposes is money 
taken away from trade, and borrowing will thus tend to depress trade and increase 
unemployment‛ (cited in Blyth, 2013:123).  
Britain returned to the gold standard in 1925 with the aim to deflate prices to 
their pre-war levels, but the country was much poorer economically and financially 
very weak. Then the attempt to restore pre-war parity was extremely painful but 
was, however, fully endorsed by the Treasury and the City of London. At the same 
time the UK used interest rates to compete with the US to attract foreign investors 
with much weaker economy. The economic crisis and high levels of unemployment 
created a lot of resentment among the working people and culminated in the 1926 
general strike. However, despite the austerity, the UK’s debt increased rather than 
decreased and public debt rose from 170% of GDP in 1930 to 190% of GDP in 
1933. Germany and France returned to gold standard in 1924 and 1926 respectively 
(Manson, 2016; Glyn, 2006).  
During the post-war period, the major European economies encountered 
enormous difficulties, the UK and France had accumulated huge amounts of debts 
to the US, while Germany was asked to pay the allied powers huge reparations 
(Dunn, 2014; Glyn, 2006). At the same time the US had excess capital available, 
which soon began to flow to Europe, where the possibility of higher returns 
existed. But in 1928 the US Federal Reserve increased the rate of interest in order 
to dampen domestic demand and to control the rise in prices. This development 
reversed the flow of capital as investors found the US market more attractive. 
Capital flight also increased and under this situation European countries imposed 
greater doses of austerity. The access to loans declined and tariffs were raised. The 
economic crisis deepened and ultimately sterling was devalued against US dollar. 
The recession turned into the Great Depression. Soon after, Germany and the US 
came off the gold standard; thus both countries could adjust domestic costs by 
allowing their exchange rates to slide rather than forcing internal deflation of 
wages (Tcherneva, 2012).  
In such a gloomy economic environment, macro-economic management was 
seen by J.M. Keynes (1936) as a vital policy tool. He came out in support of the 
state playing a leading role in the economy with the aim to maintain full 
employment along with monetary and fiscal stability. During the Great Depression, 
Keynes publicly argued that government spending is crucial to reduce 
unemployment. He supported Lloyd George’s policy initiative of reducing 
unemployment with the help of public works which could be financed by 
borrowing. Furthermore, among businesses and political elites who earlier did not 
favour public works, state intervention and economic planning, there was reflection 
and critical thinking about what went wrong, which resulted in reluctant support 
for Keynesian policies in the UK and the US (Siddiqui, 2015a). According to 
Keynes, the purpose behind increases in public spending during a slump is to 
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mobilise unused resources, especially labour, so that aggregate demand could be 
increased. Multiplier effects ensure that ultimately economic activity exceeds 
initial government spending (Glyn, 2006). 
However, Friedrich Hayek (1960) expressed scepticism about Keynes’ 
proposition. According to Hayek most of the trouble is due to ‘imprudent 
borrowing and spending on the part of public authorities’. Hayek was seen as the 
father of neoliberalism and it is true that he was not a big supporter of state 
activism. Hayek in his book The Constitution of Liberty (1960) viewed the 
transition in the late 1940s from a very elitist perspective. He emphasised 
competition as the defining characteristic of human relations. For him, the market 
would discover a natural hierarchy of winners and losers and the market would be 
able to create a more efficient system than could ever be devised by planning and 
state intervention. He suggested several policies that impeded this process, such as 
government regulation, higher taxation on businesses, trade union activities or state 
provision, would be counter-productive. According to Hayek (1960), unrestricted 
entrepreneurship would be able to create the wealth and employment that would 
later on ‘trickle down’ and benefit the whole society. Commenting on adoption of 
neoliberal policies in recent decades, George Monbiot, (2016) argues:  
Their [Thatcher and Reagan’s] massive tax cuts for the rich, crushing of trade 
unions, reduction in public housing, deregulation, privatisation, outsourcing 
and competition in public services were all proposed by Hayek and his 
disciples. But the real triumph of this network was not its capture of the right, 
but its colonisation of parties that once stood for everything Hayek 
detested… Hayek’s triumph could be witnessed everywhere from Blair’s 
expansion of the private finance initiative to Clinton’s repeal of Glass 
Steagall Act, which had regulated the financial sector (Monbiot, 2016). 
Michal Kalecki (1944) suggested that budget deficits could be used as a 
mechanism to secure full employment and high levels of economic activity. When 
there is no presumption that saving and investment will be in balance at full 
employment then a deficit budget could be used as an important policy tool to raise 
economic activity in the country. Kalecki proposed three alternatives to secure a 
level of demand to be consistent with full employment namely, (i) the use of 
budget deficits, (ii) income redistribution and (iii) stimulation of investment. The 
use of income redistribution could be consistent with arguments of the progressive 
approach to reduce deficit and it could be a massive redistribution of income from 
higher incomes to lower income group i.e. from profits to wages. This could lower 
the propensity to save and hence stimulate aggregate demand. Keynes argued in 
support of balancing the current budget across the business cycle: deficits during 
the slump, surpluses during the boom and using the capital budget to ensure full 
employment. Kalecki emphasised the need for permanent budget deficits to keep 
full employment across the business cycle. Kalecki suggested: "it is true that profits 
would be higher under a regime of full employment than they are on average under 
laissez faire...[D]iscipline in factories and political stability are more appreciated 
by the business leaders than profits. Their class instincts tell them that lasting full 
employment is unsound... and that unemployment is an integral part of the normal 
capitalist system‛. (Kalecki, 1971:141, cited in Konzelmann, 2014:716) Kalecki 
further acknowledges that ‚the pressures of all these forces, in particular of big 
businesses, would most probably induce the Government to return to the orthodox 
policy of cutting down the budget deficit (Kalecki, 1971:144, cited in Konzelmann, 
2014:716). 
 
3. Reason behind turning to Austerity 
Austerity policy failed in the 1930s to promote recovery. In the 1930s, 
unemployment exceeded 20% in the US and the UK. Keynes criticised the 
weakness of the neo-classical theory that it assumed full employment could persist 
for a long period and automatic mechanism could propel the economy towards full 
employment. Keynes further attacked the theory for assuming unemployment was 
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either frictional or voluntary. The former is a short-lived phenomenon and is the 
outcome of disequilibrium between demand and supply in isolated markets. In the 
latter case, it arises due to higher wage demands i.e. above marginal productivity 
by the workers. In the long run aggregate supply and aggregate demand would 
reach an equilibrium point at full employment. Keynes challenged this and argued 
that unemployment of the 1930s was involuntary unemployment and was due to 
lack of demand (Konzelmann, 2014). 
 It is very logical to hope that an increase in public investment could lead to 
higher private investment and higher growth, which would presumably generate 
more business opportunities and employment. Then why would businesses oppose 
any such move? The crucial point of the austerity is how to maintain investors’ 
confidence. This determines not only the ability to borrow but also the terms and 
conditions upon which the banks will be willing to lend. In fact, if government debt 
rise to such levels that cause creditor concerns about their investments along with 
perceived higher risks, this could demand higher rates of interest. Therefore, the 
costs of borrowing may increase.  
The question also arises as to the level of public debt which might be described 
as ‘too high’? The public debt-to-GDP ratios for average advanced economies have 
fluctuated widely. The average public debt in 1922 was 116.2% of GDP, which 
during World War II rose to 144.6% in 1945. In 1932 during the Great Depression 
the average levels of public debt for Western Europe and North America was 
94.7%, which declined to 72.8% in 1937 (Tcherneva, 2012).  
Moreover, it is also important to stress that the financial sector has become very 
important for the advanced economies as it contributes huge amount of tax revenue 
and helps globally to control strategic resources and generate profits as indicated 
by the outflows of capital to advanced economies (Siddiqui & Armstrong, 2017). 
For example, in 2014 the US had the largest stock of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (US$ 4,935bn), the UK had the second largest stock of the FDI (US$ 
1,606bn), France (US$ 1,081bn), Germany (US$ 852bn), Netherlands (US$ 
670bn). The outwards FDI in terms of percentage of their GDP were the following: 
the Netherlands (174.4%), UK (54.9%), Germany (41%), the US (33.4%) and total 
for OECD is (42%) in 2014. In the list of top 500 global corporations, the UK was 
in second position behind the US (OECD, 2016). 
The proponents of orthodoxy also argue that government should avoid public 
sector deficits because it could create inflationary pressures in the economy 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). This assertion might be considered erroneous as at 
present in UK the rate of inflation is less than 1% despite historically high deficits. 
The deficit has fallen slowly and for the fiscal year 2014-15 was less than £60 
billion, which is below 5% of GDP, compared to more than 10% in 2012. In the 
UK currently government borrowing has fallen, inflation is almost zero, and there 
is hardly any expectation of dramatic rise in the deficit. Under such circumstances 
hardly any justification is needed in favour of an austerity programme (Skidelsky, 
2016). 
The IMF (2012) cross-country study has found that fiscal consolidation 
promotes growth and creates employment. The study relied on the data from 
developed and developing countries between 1970 and 2007. A negative 
relationship was found between government debts and subsequent per capita GDP 
growth. The study claims that a 10% increase in the initial debt-GDP ratio was 
associated with a fall in GDP per capita growth of 0.2% per annum. Another study 
by Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) also observed a significant positive correlation 
between high levels of public debts and economic stagnation. Their study found 
that following a financial crisis, employment and output recovered very slowly and 
the average duration of debt overhang episodes is twenty-three years. They argued 
that a public debt ‘threshold’ of 90% of GDP at which economic growth begins to 
contract. Their study was used by the governments to launch austerity policies. For 
instance, Olli Rehn, the EU Commissioner for Economic Affairs, argued citing the 
above study as the benchmark for EU countries. According to Rehn, public debts in 
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Europe are expected to stabilise only by 2014 at above 90% of the GDP and such 
high levels of debts act as a permanent drag on growth (Rehn, 2013).  
Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) suggest that government debt above a critical 
threshold of 90% can be a drag on the economy and could become an obstacle to 
achieve economic growth. There has been a wide range of critiques of their report. 
For instance, Paul Krugman argues that large debt can be accommodated at lower 
costs by running a balanced budget in times when growth rises and economy is in 
the upswing, therefore, real GDP increases faster than debt during the high growth 
rate, the debt stock will shrink in real terms over time (Krugman, 2012). It is 
obvious that low growth could lead to more debt so a sensible policy option should 
be to increase growth. Theoretical justification was provided by Reinhart & Rogoff 
(2010), for a long-term relationship between public debt and economic growth. 
According to them, higher public debts could lead to a stagnation of growth. In 
such a situation, the government has limited options for reducing public debt to 
restore growth. They note further that such measures can be expected to increase 
business confidence. This is expected to have ultimately a positive effect on private 
sector investment and output. Reinhart and Rogoff state that once the debt-to-GDP 
exceeds the threshold ratio of 90%, average growth fell from 3% to -0.1% in the 
Post-World War. However, critics say that significant data omissions, questionable 
weighting methods and elementary coding errors have been found (Herndon et al., 
2014). 
The Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) study has been rejected by other economists on 
the grounds that their analysis did not cite any theoretical work and could not 
demonstrate logically that such a link between high levels of public debts and 
economic growth exists. Their study has been challenged on ground of 
methodological weaknesses as Herndon et al., (2014:277) comment: 
[The] use of data to construct a set of stylised facts characterising the 
relationship between public debt levels and GDP growth for a range of 
national economies and a range of time periods… [Reinhart and Rogoff] RR 
made significant mistakes in reaching the conclusion that countries facing 
public debt levels in excess of 90% of GDP will experience a major decline 
in their GDP growth rate. The key problems we have identifies with RR’s 
work, exclusion of available data, spreadsheet errors and an inappropriate 
weighting period, significantly reduced the measured average GDP growth 
rate for countries in >90% public debt/GDP category… into a false image 
that high public debt ratios inevitably entail sharp declines in GDP growth.  
There seems to be two alternative views. One view is that fiscal consolidation 
and a reduction in budget deficits will boost confidence and lower interest rates, 
which will ultimately increase investment and economic growth. Another view is 
that to increase investments and exports, increasing public expenditure are crucial 
to restore domestic demand. It means there will be no justification for cuts in 
public expenditure (Skidelsky, 2016). 
By the end of June 2016, the total amount of the UK’s public debt was £1.7 
trillion and the tax collected was £750 billion in the last fiscal year. It has been said 
‚How are they going to pay it back?‛ and is characterised as ‚the burden on our 
children and grandchildren‛. The UK’s public debt is now (2016) at 84% of GDP. 
According to Reinhart & Rogoff (2010) high levels of debts could be a reason for a 
rapid rise in interest rates and ‚potentially massive‛ fiscal costs and this could 
require a significant tax rise and spending cuts, and ultimately an increase in 
unemployment.  
The levels of public debt in the UK and the US are much lower compared to 
Japan’s 230% of its GDP. In fact, both UK and US public debt since 2008 have 
been accompanied by a decline in the cost of public borrowing to near zero. Some 
argue that it will add to ‘the burden on the future generation’ as a justification for 
fiscal tightening. The economist A.P. Lerner (1972) has stated that the burden of 
reduced consumption to pay for increased public spending is borne by the 
generation that lends the government the money in the first place (since the real 
resources used by the government are not available to the current generation), and 
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if financed by taxes, debt does not rise. Alesina & Ardagna (2010) argue that, 
whether financed by borrowing or taxation, such a policy would ultimately reduce 
private consumption. 
The critics of austerity argue that fiscal contraction could prolong recession. 
They further emphasise that reductions in public spending could reduce domestic 
consumption and could have dampening effects on levels of confidence on 
businesses and hence undermine potential growth prospects (Skidelsky, 2016). 
Another study (Chick & Pettifor, 2011) on fiscal consolidation in Pre-War Britain 
found the public debt ratio increased and macroeconomic conditions worsened, but 
later in the post-war period with the fiscal expansion the debt ratio fell and the 
economy witnessed higher growth rates. Their findings were also supported by 
Crotty’s study (2012) that austerity slows down economic growth, increases 
inequality and unemployment and as a consequence further increases deficits 
which in turn could further increase demand for austerity. Another more recent 
study by Stockhammer (2015) argues that rising inequality and falling real wages 
are the major factors responsible for reducing aggregate demand in the current 
economic crisis, as the poorer sections of society have a relatively high marginal 
propensity to consume. 
In the UK, during the Second World War, public debt rose. However, with 
steady GDP growth public debt was paid down and until the end of 1960s, the 
government seemed to be committed to full employment. There were also controls 
on credit and macroeconomic stability was kept under control. During this period 
there was also largely a harmony between labour and capital and also there was a 
steady rise in living conditions and a decline in inequality.  
On the differences in the levels of development, Konzelmann (2014:718-719) 
observed: 
The British economy, as the least war-damaged in Western Europe, had a 
relatively prosperous 1950s. But it had failed to modernise and remained 
fundamentally uncompetitive. On the top of this, competition intensified with 
re-emergence of Japan and continental European countries as leading 
industrial competitors and with the rapid increase in low cost manufacturing 
in developing countries. Manufactured imports into other industrialised 
economies surged, causing a sharp deterioration in trade balances... This 
resulted in widespread destruction of jobs and rising unemployment. 
When the global financial crisis hit the West, the excessive debt-led over-
consumption boom reached a critical point. The global financial crisis in 2008 
discredited the neo-classical free-market self-regulating model and its policy 
prescriptions ha to be replaced by aKeynesian stimulation package in the advanced 
economies, but it was continued for only one year. 
McCausland, & Theodossiou (2016:1105) argue: 
[regarding the] effects of fiscal austerity on debt-to-GDP ratio using from 
data on a panel of [11 OECD countries] for which data on the relevant factors 
are available [from 1981 to 2011]. Contrary to traditional predictions, it turns 
out that over long historical span, fiscal contractions deteriorated rather than 
improved public debt as a percentage of GDP. This implies that fiscal 
austerity exacerbates the lack of demand and deteriorates rather than 
enhances the prospects of economic recovery.  
They further reiterated that fiscal austerity increases the national debt and 
deepens the economic crisis and past experiences provide ample evidence of such 
claims. 
In the 2008 financial crisis, Keynesian ideas became more popular, especially 
the role of fiscal deficits to rescue the economy. Major industrialised countries 
such as the US and the UK- in 2009- favoured adopting a fiscal package to 
stimulate the economy and were able to avert depression, but still levels of 
unemployment remained quite high and public debt reached high levels (Wolf, 
2011). Under such circumstances, both economists and policy makers began to talk 
about debt and austerity. These arguments were presented as a remedy from the 
risk of sovereign debt defaults and after one year of the crisis, Keynesian policy 
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was abandoned. The immediate mechanism for the transformation of private debt 
into state debt was accomplished quietly. The IMF (2016) estimated a nearly 40% 
average increase in public sector debt across the OECD countries. Half of this 
amount is due to replacing lost revenues of the collapsed financial sector i.e. the 
state had to rescue the financial sector from collapse. For example, the UK’s 
financial sector is responsible for the dramatic fall in tax receipts of about 25% 
(Mason, 2016; Konzelmann, 2014). The financial sector was deregulated in the 
name of market self-control, efficiency and growth but ultimately, this resulted in 
huge losses, which were transferred to the state.  
 
4. Neoliberalism and financialization 
In the late 1970s in the UK, criticism of government policy came to the fore in 
the context of economic crisis. It was argued that the crisis had been brought about 
by too much state and trade union intervention, which had stifled the economy and 
led to the economic crisis. Accordingly, the prescription for resolving the socio-
economic crisis meant rolling back the state and reduction of workers’ rights a 
theoretical foundation later built on by Margret Thatcher after the 1979 victory of 
the Conservative Party (Lawson, 2015; Harvey, 2005). 
Defining neoliberalism David Harvey (2005:15) argues that: ‚the evidence 
strongly suggests that the neoliberal turn is in some way and to some degree 
associated with the restoration or reconstruction of the power of economic elites‛. 
Further Saad-Filho & Johnston (2004:3) defines financialization as: ‚[the] most 
basic feature of neoliberalism is the systematic use of state power to impose 
(financial) market imperatives in a domestic process that is replicated 
internationally by globalization‛.  
These definitions are a bit too broad and do not include the ideas and interests 
of the ruling elites who formulate the policies. In fact, neoliberalism can be 
understood as a policy which legitimised markets as self-regulated and presumed 
that imposing such policies meant their interests could be safeguarded (Girdner & 
Siddiqui, 2008). 
To explain the concept of financialization, Lapavitsas (2008:34) defines it as 
follows:  
Financialization… does not amount to dominance of banks over industrial 
and commercial capital. It stands rather for increasing autonomy of the 
financial sector. Industrial and commercial capitals are able to borrow in 
open financial markets, while being more heavily implicated in financial 
transactions. Meanwhile, financial institutions have sought new sources of 
profitability in personal income and financial market mediation.  
In another study Lapavitsas has observed that financialization had not only 
altered power structure, but also impacted on the salariat:  
Financialization, finally, has allowed the ethics, morality and mind-set of 
finance to penetrate into the deepest recesses of social and individual life. 
Social values have been affected by the outlook of the financier… Waves of 
greed have been released by the transformation of housing and pension into 
‘investments’, dragging individuals into financial bubbles (cited in Mason, 
2010:228). 
Therefore, it appears that contemporary financialization is very different from 
what was envisaged by Hilferding in Germany more than a century ago. He saw 
then that banks build long-term relationships with industries, which in turn allowed 
the banks to have significant control over them. In contrast to that ‚financialization 
today involves banks and industrial companies acting increasingly independently 
of one another‛ (Callinicos, 2012:67). 
During the 1990s, the policy of neoliberalism had led to the expansion of the 
financial sector and their speculative activities rose sharply on the name of 
innovation (Siddiqui, 2012). It also offered much higher returns on investments 
than could be obtained through productive investment. Moreover, the expansion of 
consumer credit and asset bubbles on the housing sector evolved into a mechanism 
through which effective demand could be created (Dumenil & Levy, 2011). Some 
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economists have blamed increased financialization on slow growth in the last 
decade and for them it was due to increased political and economic dominance by 
the global finance, which have been further institutionalised by neoliberalism 
(Lawson, 2015; Siddiqui, 2015a). 
However, the policy of financial innovation, which aimed to separate credit 
decisions from their risks by splitting them into various components, contributed to 
the financial crisis of 2008. Easy access to mortgage credit was made available to 
the poorer sections of society. In the UK, availability of easy credit acted to 
maintain effective demand. In the housing market, the rising asset prices raised 
optimism, which filtered through to demand via equity withdrawals and higher 
borrowing. Concurrently, the securitisation of subprime loans and other financial 
innovations have converted the less well-off into Ponzi speculators further fuelling 
housing prices in the US, UK, and many other countries. This provided a false 
notion of recovery and easy profits until the bubble burst (Hein & Mundt, 2012). 
The fallacy is based on the presumption that the financial crisis of 2008 was due to 
high government spending policy, while in fact it was the result of a private credit-
led speculation boom. Greece, Ireland and Spain also relied on credit-driven 
expansion (Lawson, 2015). For example, in the case of two trading nations such as 
Greece and Germany, the imposition of austerity could be counterproductive for 
both countries (Wolf, 2011). It is hardly mentioned that Germany too would be 
worse off in terms of export demands, employment, and investment because of the 
imposition of austerity in Greece.  
The financial sector has gained greater importance in sectoral terms in countries 
such as the US and the UK, while in Germany the industrial sector is stronger 
compared to other industrialised countries. Germany’s manufactured goods are still 
important in terms of employment and export; its manufacturing sector is second in 
importance after China. Their manufacturing sector is the main contributor to her 
exports. If we look at the past decade’s trend, we find that Germany showed the 
classic case of what Hilferding (1981) defined as finance capital where banks 
played a coordinating role with the industrial companies- as Sablowski (2008:154-
55) emphasises:  
The transformation of a bank-based system to a market-based system [is] 
under way in Germany, involving the dismantling of the tight link between 
the banks and their industrial and commercial partners and the beginnings of 
a ‘free market’ for corporate control.  
The UK economy has proportionately more dependency on financial services 
and is thus more vulnerable. It seems that its structural and dependency problems 
will most likely increase due to greater reliance on the finance sector’s tax revenue. 
Furthermore, such development will have an adverse impact on investment 
funding, unless the government reverses its policies on public debts. The UK 
budget deficit for 2015-16 was £75 billion and this was higher than forecasted. 
Public debts in 2016 amounted to £90 billion (Skidelsky, 2016). Moreover, the 
absence of active fiscal policy is perpetuating the dominance of monetary policy 
through the role of the Bank of England (Seccareccia, 2012). Monetary policy 
based on near zerointerest rates appears to continue to discourage savings. In the 
UK, the larger size of the financial sector meant the 2008 crisis brought big losses 
and tax revenues fell sharply. However, there is a difference between Eurozone 
countries and the UK. The UK has its own central bank and currency and could 
potentially pay its own debts, in which most is denominated in pounds (Skidelsky, 
2016). For Eurozone member countries the ECB does not have an explicit ‘lender 
of last resort’ obligation as Federal Reserve in the case of US and Bank of England 
in the UK (Morgan, 2009). 
The UK should reduce the size of the financial sector by supporting the 
expansion of the manufacturing sector, especially in high skilled sectors and 
environmental technology by subsidising and increasing public investment. In fact, 
de-financialization i.e. a decline of the role of financial sector took place between 
the 1940 and 1960s. Rapid expansion of the financial sector over the last 30 years 
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or so along with the de-regulation and financial liberalisation boosted the 
expansion of financial sector in the economy in most OECD countries. At present 
the financial sector has become too large and dysfunctional.  There are a number of 
studies which tell us that financial sectors now cost society very highly by 
absorbing resources unproductively, leading to unemployment and economic 
instability (Sawyer, 2011). The financial sector should have stakeholder control so 
that its activities are more likely to benefit society. Outside regulation would build 
more transparency and be an incentive to more ethical behaviour in the financial 
sector. Society was told that there was no alternative to neoliberalism, ‘free-
markets’ and financialisation but this was an ideological campaign that ultimately 
led first to the global financial crisis and second, supported the unjustifiable 
socialisation of losses after the banking crisis (Wade, 2009). In fact, the 
neoliberalism has remained influential and continued to inspire studies in political 
economy of the policies since the 1980s and more recently it has become the 
dominant ideology of the discourse of globalisation (Girdner & Siddiqui, 2008). 
 
5. Macroeconomic performance 
I consider that it is important to discuss macroeconomic data if we are to 
understand whether the austerity policy of nearly a decade has been able to achieve 
its stated goals or not. The UK’s GDP growth in the last twenty-five years (1991-
2015) was on average less than 2% and inflation has remained low as indicated in 
Table 1. However, unemployment rates have been between 9-10%, while during 
the higher growth rate period it declined to an average of around 6%, as shown in 
Table 1. The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed people as a 
percentage of the labour force. GDP during the period of 1991-2015 has steadily 
grown, except in 2008-2010. However, the UK’s negative growth performance was 
poorer than in the US and Germany, while the performance of France and Japan 
(Siddiqui, 2015b) was lower than the UK during the same period as shown in the 
Figure 1.  
Growth picked up in the UK in 2014, but again slowed in 2015 and is projected 
to be 1.1% in 2016. The officially registered unemployment rate has fallen to 
around 5%. The current account deficit has reached 7% of GDP, the highest level 
on record, increasing vulnerabilities. It seems that GDP growth in the UK is based 
on weak foundations mainly because of the rise in inequality and stagnation in 
wages (Stockhammer, 2015). These are among the main causes of recession and in 
recent years the government did not make any effort to correct this. For instance, 
real wages are still down by 9% compared to mid-2008. Moreover, the increased 
‘financialization’ and sectoral shifts in favour of finance have slowed down 
investment and growth in manufacturing.   
 
Table 1. UK’s Macroeconomic Data (%) from 1991 to 2016 
year Growth rate Inflation rate Unemployment Rate 
1991 -1.3 3.6 9.2 
1992 0.2 3.7 9.1 
1993 2.4 1.5 9.8 
1994 4.0 2.4 8.8 
1995 2.5 3.4 7.6 
1996 2.7 2.4 6.9 
1997 3.1 3.1 5.3 
1998 3.2 3.4 4.5 
1999 3.1 1.5 4.1 
2000 3.8 2.9 5.5 
2001 2.8 1.7 5.0 
2002 2.5 1.6 5.1 
2003 3.3 1.3 4.9 
2004 2.5 1.3 4.6 
2005 3.0 2.0 4.7 
2006 2.7 2.3 5.5 
2007 2.6 2.3 5.2 
2008 -0.5 3.6 5.6 
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2009 -4.2 2.1 7.5 
2010 1.5 3.3 7.7 
2011 2.0 4.4 8.0 
2012 1.2 2.8 7.8 
2013 2.2 2.5 7.5 
2014 2.9 1.4 6.1 
2015 2.3 1.6 5.3 
2016 1.7 1.0 5.3 
Source: Calculated form National Income, various issues, Economic Annual Trends. [Retrieved 
from].  
 
 
Figure 1. Real GDP Forecast for Selected OECD Countries total, annual growth rate (%), 
1991– 2019. 
Source: Accessed on January 4, 2018. [Retrieved from]. 
Note: US shown in green colour, Germany in blue, France in red, UK in orange and Japan in purple 
colour. 
 
The latest figures reveal that the weaknesses of the UK’s economy are much 
deeper than widely acknowledged by commentators. As Chang (2016) points out: 
‚Britain has never properly recovered from the 2008 financial crisis. At the end of 
2015, inflation adjusted income per capita in the UK was only 0.2% higher than its 
2007 peak. This translates into an annual growth rate of 0.25% per year… Japan’s 
per capita income during its so-called ‚lost two decades‛ between 1990 and 2010 
grew at 1% a year… At the root this inability to stage a real recovery in the serious 
imbalances that have developed is the past few decades – namely, the over 
development of the UK financial sector...‛ 
In the UK, manufacturing’s share of GDP has stagnated at about 10%. This is 
astonishing because in recent months the value of sterling has fallen by about 30% 
without bringing about a dramatic increase in manufacturing exports (Mason, 
2016). 
The advocates of a larger financial sector argue that in a post-industrial 
knowledge economy, manufacturing matters little (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2010). The 
example of Switzerland is cited in support of this conclusion, claiming that it has a 
larger per capita income than the UK while largely basing itself on finance and 
tourism. Such arguments ignore the fact that despite the growing importance of 
services in recent years, manufacturing makes a major contribution to productivity 
growth. This is more visible in chemical processes and the machine sector which 
are areas of intensive research and development and thus of technology 
development. Even productivity rises in the services sectors depend on advanced 
inputs produced by the manufacturing sectors such as computers, fibre-optic 
cables, GPS machines and so on. The UK’s economic problems are associated with 
the decline of the manufacturing sector.  To reverse these trends, the government 
must provide more capital, more money for research and development (R&D) and 
more investment in training and skills to build a balanced and sustainable 
economy. Short-term recovery has been largely based on debt-fuelled asset bubbles 
in real estate and finance, with stagnant wages, and welfare cuts, which cannot 
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provide the real solution. The economy must be able to utilise human potential by 
providing decent employment - by growth based on rising productivity and wages 
rather than asset bubbles and periodic crises (Hein & Mundt, 2012). 
Figure 2 shows public debt as a percentage of GDP. The UK’s public debt was 
not higher than the US in 2015 and has risen sharply since 2010 as shown in Table 
2. Public debt is measured as the sum of total state debts that have accumulated 
over the years and as a percentage of GDP. In May 2010when the coalition 
government took office in the UK, net public debt was £974 billion. This has 
increased to £1483 billion in December 2014. As a percentage of GDP in May 
2010, the net public debt was 62.7% and rose to 80.9% by December 2014. At the 
time of the global financial crisis, the level of public debt in the UK was lower in 
historical terms. For instance, in 1998 public debt was 39.9% of GDP, which 
declined to 29.3% in 2002. However, it rose to 36.7% by 2007; the main reason 
was due to long-term borrowing to invest in schools, hospitals, and infrastructure 
(Sawyer, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 2. Government Debt as Total % of GDP of Selected OECD Countries, 1998-2016. 
Source: Accessed on January 6, 2018. [Retrieved from]. 
 
In real terms the central government interest payments in 2010-11 were £47 
billion, which remained the same in 2013-14. However, the debt and interest 
payments rose sharply only after the global financial crisis of 2008 (Wolf, 2011). 
As a percentage of GDP, the UK’s interest payment on public debt has not risen 
significantly. For instance, in 1995 the UK’s interest payment on public debts was 
3.5% of GDP and declined to 2% in 2007, but rose again since the global financial 
crisis and was 3% of the GDP in 2012-13 (OECD, 2016). 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Global finance now blames the government for excessive debt, but ignores the 
fact that much of this debt was caused by the bailout of the banks in 2008 and by 
the subsequent impact of the recession on employment and growth. International 
finance does not favour high levels of public debt because they are concerned 
about repayment. Under such circumstances they prefer austerity, which 
undermines working class militancy and resiliencethrough stagnation in wages and 
welfare cuts. That was the reason Keynes came out in support of the socialisation 
of investment and wage bargaining between labour and capital, which is anathema 
to neoclassical economists. For him, attempting to reduce the public deficit by 
contracting economic activity via austerity was counter-productive. As Keynes 
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said, ‚look after employment and the budget will look after itself‛ (cited in Chick 
& Dow, 2013:15). In the UK, the problem is that, since 2010, the total numbers in 
employment have risen, while at the same time real wages have fallen. This decline 
in real wages has had an adverse impact on government revenue via tax reduction 
(Callinicos, 2012). 
After the global financial crisis of 2008 most of the advanced economies 
including the UK followed expansionary fiscal policies (Seccareccia, 2012), but 
this was discarded as soon as the economy began to pick up and the crisis was 
thought to have been managed. Then soon after, the policy was reversed in favour 
of neoliberal dogma and was accompanied by an overreliance on monetary policy 
(Siddiqui, 2012). Theensuing reduction in interest rates was expected to restore 
confidence in the economy and to encourage investment and growth. This present 
study has argued that austerity and deficit reduction during the recession has led to 
declining output and to an increase in unemployment. In fact, the current recession 
is due to a deficiency in demand which remains at a level below the productive 
capacity of the economy. The capitalist undertakes investment only when demand 
is expected to increase. The austerity cuts in government spending combined with 
stagnant wages can hardly stimulate sufficient investment (Kalecki, 1971).  
This study has critically examined the mainstreams view that deficit financing 
could increase liquidity, nurture an inflationary tendency in the economy and thus, 
increase the role of state in the economy. IMF recent forecasts predict slower 
growth next year, therefore there seems to be more pressing need for the 
government to reverse austerity policy and rely on deficit financing to boost 
economy, especially in the social sector. In response to deficit leads to inflation 
Kalecki remarked that, ‚inflation is sometimes identified with the existence of a 
large budget deficit, but this definition is not satisfactory… budget deficits do not 
necessarily involve inflation and that balanced budget is not a safeguard against 
inflation‛ (cited in Sawyer, 2001:250). He further argues: ‚[I]n spite of the great 
increase in the amount of the national debt in the course of the war up to the 
present, the future ‚burden‛ of the present debt is not likely to be higher than in 
1938-39; and… it is possible to devise special taxes for financing the interest on 
the national debt which will render its increase harmless in the sense that it will 
have no repercussions on output and employment…‛ (cited in Sawyer, 2001:254).  
This study supports increased state intervention as means to enhance long term 
growth. However, such measures are anathema to most mainstream economists. 
This study also suggests that austerity as an anti-recessionary policy seems to be 
counterproductive. Hence, a reduction in government spending and stagnation in 
wages could have an adverse influence on future business investment decisions, 
which could lead to a reduction in the country’s output. A number of counter 
measures could be taken such as placing a requirement on financial institutions 
(such as pension funds) to place some minimum proportion of their asset portfolio 
into government stock and the Bank of England could be asked to provide money 
direct to government to finance its expenditure. 
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